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SYMPOSIUM
THEORIES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (AND THEIR LIMITS)
INTRODUCTION
Ellen P. Aprill*
Nancy Staudt**
The legal community has long been enamored with statutory
interpretation. Recently, and perhaps because of the work of Professors
Eskridge and Frickey (together and separately),1 scholars, judges and
analysts have paid increasing attention to the problems and issues
that arise when federal courts interpret statutes. This heightened
focus may signal scholars' realization that statutes have become the
"dominant source of modem American law" 2 and often occupy the
* Associate Dean for Academic Programs and John E. Anderson Professor of
Tax Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis.
1. Professor Eskridge's and Frickey's list of publications addressing
statutory interpretation is lengthy. A small sampling includes: WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 2001); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?
Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Philip P. Frickey,
Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84
MINN. L. REv. 199 (1999).
2. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 1, at 669.
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largest portion of the U.S. Supreme Court docket.3 Or it might be
associated with the widespread view that when judges interpret the
language of the law as found in statutes, the threat of social, legal,
and political harm is particularly acute, and thus selecting the best
means for locating statutory meaning assumes all the more
importance when federal judges settle these controversies in the
courtroom.4 Regardless of why statutory interpretation has become
popular in legal circles, and notwithstanding the numerous important
contributions made to the extant literature, we think it clear there is
room for many more such studies-be they empirical, theoretical, or
doctrinal. Indeed, statutory controversies not only continue to exist,
but also they may be more contentious today than ever before, which
makes further study all the more imperative.
The focal point of much of the recent statutory interpretation
debate is the theory of textualism, often labeled the "new-
textualism," set forth by Justice Antonin Scalia and various other
judges and academics. 5 This theory mandates that federal courts rely
on the plain language of the text when endowing a statute with
meaning. The new-textualists argue that federal courts must eschew
reliance on legislative history and other types of evidence, and then
go one step further in arguing "that courts have no authority even to
3. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic
Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 395, 416, 417 fig.2 (2002) (showing the
number of statutory interpretation controversies the Court considered between
1946-1992; in some years, such cases represented close to 80% of the total
docket).
4. For a discussion of how interpretive choices can lead to bad outcomes,
an imbalance in the separation of powers, and even to a demise in democracy
itself, see Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3
(1997); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 673 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic
Theory and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in
Statutory Interpretation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 803 (1994); Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 4, at 23-37; John F. Coverdale, Text as
Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501
(1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984).
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apply a statute to a problem unless the statute's language clearly
targets that problem.",6 Advocates of this theory ground their inter-
pretive principles in the idea that statutory language represents the
law: what congressional members wanted to say, or expected or
assumed would happen if they had thought of a particular case, is not
relevant because the legislators subjected only the words of the
statute to bicameral consideration and then presented only those
words to the president for approval or veto as required by Article I,
section 7 of the U.S. Constitution.7 Not only is this method required
by the Constitution, Justice Scalia and others argue, but it also
enables the enacting Congress to predict the effects of its language
and, just as importantly, it stays the hand of the activist judges who
might interpret statutes according to their own political preferences.
8
Needless to say, this restrictive theory of statutory interpretation
has not generated consensus on the proper method for deciding
statutory controversies; in fact, empirical data suggest that the new-
textualism is not even the dominant judicial approach for interpreting
statutes.9 Yet legal scholars continually focus on this theory, offer
new insights on the meaning of the term "plain meaning" (thereby
highlighting a problem with the approach!) set forth additional
reasons for privileging it in the decision-making process, and critique
the method for its limitations. As we note below, many of the
6. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETr, supra note 1 at 742-43; Easterbrook,
supra note 5, at 98-99.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring bicameral legislative approval and
presentment to the president before a bill can become law); see also Scalia,
supra note 4, at 25.
8. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 28-29; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 129, 131-32; Coverdale, supra
note 5, at 1507, 1522-25.
9. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, Ren6 Lindstadt
& Ryan J. Vander Wielen, Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1909 (2005) (justices use a range of statutory interpretation
approaches and no single approach has ever prevailed to the exclusion of all
others); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093, 1094 fig.1 (1992)
(justices appear to rely on their own precedent more than any other authority in
statutory interpretation cases); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common
Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:
Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv.
1, 21-28 (1998) (justices consistently use judicially selected policy norms to
decide cases).
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contributors to this symposium pick up on these ideas (implicitly or
explicitly) and push the dialogue to exciting new levels. Although
many of the authors chose to focus exclusively on the new-
textualism (a surprise given that our only request was that the
contributors investigate some aspect of statutory interpretation), this
focus was not uniform. Three of the essays explore the issues and
problems of statutory interpretation from a perspective that goes well
beyond the textualist debates; moreover, the essays that do make
new-textualism their focal point set forth a range of insights that
apply to nearly all interpretive approaches.
The first essay places the debates over interpretation into
historical context. This essay, coauthored by Nancy Staudt, Lee
Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck, Ren6 Lindstiidt, and Ryan Vander
Wielen offers an empirical assessment of the various techniques that
the Supreme Court justices have actually relied upon over the course
of the last century in statutory controversies. 10 This investigation is
the first longitudinal, large-n study that examines the entire
population of opinions in a single substantive area of the law-tax
law-to illustrate the Court's approach to statutory interpretation in
the economic context. The authors discovered that the practice of
statutory interpretation has undergone many unexpected develop-
ments over the course of the last one hundred years. In the early
eras, the Court interpreted statutes largely relying on its own
precedent. Over time it began to rely more heavily on legislative
documents and on administrative rulings; then unexpectedly the
modem Court began to curtail reliance on administrative docu-
ments.11 The study also uses comparative data to point to the distinct
approaches that the Court uses in different areas of the law. For
example, the Court relies on administrative rulings to a far greater
extent in cases that raise economic issues than those involving civil
rights.
12
The empirical study undertaken by Staudt and her coauthors
highlights several features of statutory interpretation upon which the
symposium authors expand. First, with regard to the new-textualism
debates, the data indicate the conventional wisdom regarding Justice
10. Staudt, Epstein, Wiedenbeck, Lindstidt, & Vander Wielen, supra
note 9.
11. Id. at 1912-16.
12. Id. at 1966-69.
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Scalia's role in fomenting the interpretive revolution may be
overstated. 13 In fact, the Supreme Court began relying on the plain
language of statutes at notable levels during the Burger Court and
perhaps even as far back as the Warren Court-well before Scalia's
appointment in 1986.14 Equally interesting, the text-based approach
has never won the day in Court-the justices continue to rely on
various other types of evidence beyond the plain language for
purposes of interpreting statutory texts. 15  Professors Frickey,
Marmor, Solan, and Seto expand our understanding of textualism
and offer intriguing explanations for its failure to prevail in the
decision-making process.
As Professor Philip P. Frickey writes: "Despite nearly two
decades of textualist assault, a longstanding cluster of eclectic
interpretive practices-a balancing of textual, institutional, and
purposive considerations-seems to have remained largely intact."'
16
Investigating why the new-textualists have failed to displace
competing interpretive regimes, Frickey considers four barriers that
individuals and groups will encounter when seeking to change
current practices. One hurdle is stare decisis. As Frickey notes,
Supreme Court holdings are accorded precedential effect but
everything else-including interpretive method-is generally viewed
as mere dicta. 17  Second, courts seek to adopt transparent (i.e.,
predictable and settled) methods for interpretation in order to assure
that lower courts, parties, and counsel have a high level of certainty
and, at the same time, to assure the judicial system operates in
accordance with the rule of law and not the individual preferences of
the decision makers. 18  Moving to a new interpretive regime
undermines transparency and implies a range of transition costs that
courts are often unwilling to impose. Third, Frickey discusses the
problems that substantive and policy-based canons pose for new-
textualists. These canons are an entrenched means for understanding
statutory texts; indeed they seem to have become virtually part of the
13. Id. at 1929-64.
14. Id. at 1937.
15. Id. at 1912-16.
16. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1973-74 (2005).
17. Id. at 1974-81.
18. Id. at 1981-86.
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"normal science of statutory interpretation"' 9 and thus are unlikely to
disappear irrespective of the strong arguments made against them by
Justice Scalia and others.20 Finally, our legal culture has evolved in a
common law manner-one that invites judges to find the best and
most rational outcome regardless of method, and this implies that
judges will not constrain themselves by the new-textualism in cases
when it interferes with what they perceive as the best and most
rational outcome for a given case.
2'
Professor Theodore P. Seto considers yet another reason for the
failure of the new-textualism--or for that matter, any theory of
textual interpretation that mandates decision makers to commit to an
originalist understanding of the legal text.22 In making his case, Seto
investigates the relationship between evolution and the development
of ideas, that only the best are able to survive in our legal and social
culture. Expanding on this Darwinian concept, Seto argues, "[T]he
very essence of the human evolutionary strategy is to make cultural
learning possible." 23 In Seto's view, this reality suggests that our
most important values, including those associated with liberty,
equality, democracy, and the rule of law, can be framed in terms of
their adaptivity for modem society.24 The evolution of ideas leads
the author to argue that any technique of interpretation that
systematically bars the decision maker from relying upon learning is
problematic; after reading Seto's essay, we could go one step further
and argue that any constrained methodological approach is also
bound to fail under this theory.
Does the new-textualism completely bar learning or does it
allow for some adaptation to the ideas and customs that have
emerged since the time Congress enacted the statute? Professor
Lawrence M. Solan's discussion of the new-textualism suggests that
the theory is not as cramped as many analysts perceive it to be.
25
The textual model advocated by even the strictest textualists,
19. Id. at 1992.
20. Id. at 1986-92.
21. Id. at 1992-96.
22. Theodore P. Seto, Originalism vs. Precedent: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2001 (2005).
23. Id. at 2016.
24. Id. at 2015-17.
25. Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists' New Text, 38 LOy. L.A. L.
REV. 2027 (2005).
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according to Solan, allows a decision maker to resort to dictionary
meanings (entrenched meanings that often do not change with
context) as well as to the "ordinary meanings" that emerge from the
social, cultural, and legal context. 26 As Solan points out, the psycho-
linguistic literature indicates that most people use both approaches
for purposes of understanding language and that both approaches are
found in court opinions.27 Even this expansive approach, however,
may limit judges to interpretations that, at most, accommodate for an
understanding of text that the enacting Congress had in mind, but not
for the cultural learning that took place between the time the statute
was adopted and the time the Court decided the controversy. 28 in
short, Solan's version of new-textualism is nuanced and may be
descriptively accurate, but may also suffer from the evolutionary
downsides articulated by Seto.
Professor Andrei Marmor examines new-textualism from a
moral-political perspective and argues that the theory is problematic
in all its forms. 29 Marmor notes that while "easy cases" do exist, for
the most part the controversies that reach the courtroom involve
vague and ambiguous statutes that courts cannot interpret with the
use of a dictionary, with reference to the words' ordinary meanings,
or with an overall better grasp of language-in short, judges need
evidence beyond the statutory text to decide the case properly.
30
Marmor insists the problem of indeterminacy cannot have been
overlooked by the new-textualists; instead, he argues they use it to
their advantage: to avoid applying statutes to legal controversies and
thus to limit the government's ability to pursue regulatory goals
through legislation.3 1 Marmor makes a strong argument that this
agenda is morally bankrupt. First, abiding by the new-textualist
methods, in effect, forces judges to use people as a means to
effectuate political ends rather than interpreting statutes in the best
and fairest way.32  Second, the new-textualists have adopted a
teaching role, that is, they hope to force legislators to write more
26. Id. at 2030-31.
27. Id. at 2039-44.
28. Id. at 2048-53.
29. Andrei Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REv.2063 (2005).
30. Id. at 2074-76.
31. Id. at 2065-66.
32. Id. at 2068-69.
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clearly. This role seriously interferes with federal courts' fiduciary
duty to apply the law in good faith and as intended by its authors-
even if that intent is not made clear in the text of the statute.
33
Professor Ellen Aprill focuses not on textualism, but on the
underlying power dynamics that emerge in any statutory interpre-
tation controversy. 34 She notes that different interpretive approaches
implicitly give different branches of government greater and lesser
control over the law making process. To make her point, she
examines the effects of the 1984 Supreme Court case, Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.35 Prior to Chevron, most
theorists agree that the Court adopted a range of approaches for
interpreting statutes that could include reliance on the statutory text,
congressional hearings, administrative rulings, and so forth.36 In
Chevron, the justices adopted a new two-step approach requiring
courts to discern congressional intent without relying on adminis-
trative rulings. Only in those rare circumstances where federal
courts find the statute ambiguous can they look to documents
emanating from the executive branch. As Aprill points out, this
holding gives a surprising amount of power to the judicial branch. It
allows courts to silence the administrative agencies if they are able to
find congressional intent-something courts frequently are able to
do. 37 In fact, Aprill notes that even when courts find a statute vague
and ambiguous, they nevertheless often ignore administrative
rulings, in reliance on Supreme Court opinions issued after
Chevron.38  Professor Aprill posits that interpretive regimes may
cycle in and out of favor, but at the moment it is clear the judicial
voice dominates.
Finally, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew McCubbins, and Daniel
Rodriquez offer an altogether new approach for finding the meaning
of a statute.3 9 They point out that scholars and judges tend to look to
legislative intent for understanding statutes when in reality it is
33. Id. at 2070-72
34. Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 2081
(2005).
35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
36. See Aprill, supra note 34, at 2085-90.
37. Id. at 2090-95.
38. Id. at 2117-18.
39. Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel Rodriguez, The
Intentional Stance, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 2131 (2005).
1906
INTRODUCTION
virtually impossible to discern actual intent given the collective
nature of the legislative process.40 This reality does not mean, in the
authors' view, that interpreters should ignore entirely the concept of
"intent." Rather interpreters should acknowledge the search for
actual intent is a "fool's errand' 4 1 and thus should pursue an
approach that involves imputing intent to legislative actors for
purposes of finding statutory meaning.42 As Boudreau, McCubbins,
and Rodriquez note, humans impute intent in virtually every context
by assuming actors are rational and have beliefs, desires, and
intentions, and indeed federal judges ma]/already subconsciously use
this approach for interpreting statutes.4  Although still in its early
stages, the authors set forth a promising new approach for
interpreting statutes that relies on the recent theories that have
emerged in cognitive science and philosophy.
As the seven essays in this symposium demonstrate, as long as
legislative texts govern social and legal interaction, it is unlikely that
judges, scholars, and commentators will reach consensus on the
proper approach for interpreting statutes. Further, these essays
suggest that numerous methods exist for finding meaning-
empirical, sociological, evolutionary, linguistic, philosophical,
institutional, and psychological-but it is highly improbable that any
single approach will win the day either among academics or in the
courtroom. Each of the techniques offers its own set of insights, as
well as its own advantages and disadvantages. Together they
evidence a richness and depth that honors the importance of the issue
in modem American law.
40. Id. at 2133-35.
41. Id. at 2134.
42. Id. at 2137-38.
43. Id. at 2138.
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